Common value auctions with default: An experimental approach

DOI10.1023/A:1020840420643MaRDI QIDQ1870294zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew R. Roelofs

Publication date 11 May 2003

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1020840420643

zbMATH Keywords

defaultexperimental economicswinner's curselimited liabilitycommon value auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(3)

• Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation
• Participation and welfare in auctions with default
• Experimental evidence on English auctions: oral outcry versus clock

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