Comparing finite mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00199-001-0253-8MaRDI QIDQ1404153zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Leonid Hurwicz, Thomas Marschak

Publication date 20 August 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-001-0253-8

zbMATH Keywords

Exchange economiesInformation processingMechanism designMechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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(3)

• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
• Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies
• Optimal mechanisms with finite agent types

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