Competitive equilibrium in the random assignment problem

DOI10.1111/IJET.12135MaRDI QIDQ4584852zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 4 September 2018

Published in International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66290/1/MPRA_paper_66290.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriummechanism designrandom assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(7)

• Perfect competition in the continuous assignment model
• An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money
• Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
• Approximate random allocation mechanisms
• Balanced equilibrium in pseudo-markets with endowments
• Computational complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism for one-sided matching markets
• Computational complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser scheme for one-sided matching markets

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