Computing Shapley Value in Supermodular Coalitional Games

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-32241-9_48MaRDI QIDQ2914358zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, Tom Wexler, Kevin M. Woods

Publication date 25 September 2012

Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32241-9_48

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Approximation algorithms (68W25)

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(16)

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• Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
• A cooperative game-theoretic approach to the social ridesharing problem
• Shapley meets Shapley
• Approximating the least core value and least core of cooperative games with supermodular costs
• Efficient computation of the Shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality
• Computing stable coalitions: approximation algorithms for reward sharing
• Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7559220 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Sharing supermodular costs
• Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
• Encouraging Cooperation in Sharing Supermodular Costs
• Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games

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