Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.06.007MaRDI QIDQ900252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Murat Yılmaz

Publication date 22 December 2015

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.007

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem
• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem

Cites work

• Choice and procrastination
• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
• Incentives for Procrastinators
• On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem

Cited in

(9)

• Screening with privacy on (im)persistency
• Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Intentional time inconsistency
• Time-inconsistent contract theory
• Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• A solvable time-inconsistent principal-agent problem

This page was built for publication: Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q900252)