Costly Signalling in Auctions

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00418.XMaRDI QIDQ5293371zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Sahuguet

Publication date 2 July 2007

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/J.1467-937X.2007.00418.X

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• A theory of costly sequential bidding
• Creating a winner's curse via jump bids
• Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
• Bribing and signaling in second price auctions

Cited in

(14)

• Preemptive bidding and Pareto efficiency in takeover auctions
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power
• Bidding frictions in ascending auctions
• Creating a winner's curse via jump bids
• The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions
• A theory of costly sequential bidding
• A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
• Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection
• Signaling through entry in auctions with sequential and costly participation
• Compulsory license threats in a signaling game of drug procurement
• Costly waiting in dynamic contests: theory and experiment
• The impact of perceived strength in the war of attrition
• On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly

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