Crowdsourced Bayesian auctions

DOI10.1145/2090236.2090257MaRDI QIDQ2826060zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo Azar, Jing Chen, Silvio Micali

Publication date 7 October 2016

Published in Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2090236.2090257

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Asymptotic calibration
• Dimension in Complexity Classes
• Effective Strong Dimension in Algorithmic Information and Computational Complexity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3227613 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Complexity of Forecast Testing
• The dimensions of individual strings and sequences
• THE FRACTIONAL DIMENSION OF A SET DEFINED BY DECIMAL PROPERTIES
• The reproducible properties of correct forecasts
• The Well-Calibrated Bayesian
• Universal prediction

Cited in

(8)

• The expected externality mechanism in a level-\(k\) environment
• A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller
• Bayesian auctions with efficient queries
• Designing markets for daily deals
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
• On improved interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets
• Worst‐case equilibria in first‐price auctions
• Auction design with heterogeneous priors

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