Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0001MaRDI QIDQ1916280zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Matthew Rabin, Joel Sobel

Publication date 19 January 1997

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0001

zbMATH Keywords

recurrent equilibriasignaling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
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Cited in

(11)

• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
• A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets
• On the inconsistency of equilibrium refinement
• Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
• Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
• Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games
• Refinement of proper equilibrium points
• Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest
• Informal communication

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