Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0618-XMaRDI QIDQ1757092zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Oriol Tejada, Philip D. Grech

Publication date 28 December 2018

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0618-x

zbMATH Keywords

sequential procedurebargainingrisk aversionNash bargaining solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
• Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants
• Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty
• Nash bargaining and risk aversion
• Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3756277 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3079001 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Bargaining solutions without the expected utility hypothesis
• Bargaining with an agenda
• Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
• Generalized Raiffa solutions
• Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo
• Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
• Nash bargaining and risk aversion
• On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes.
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• Strategic step-by-step negotiation
• The bargaining problem
• The importance of the agenda in bargaining

Cited in

(3)

• Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants
• Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points
• Bargaining with a residual claimant: an experimental study

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