Dynamic incentives in incompletely specified environments

DOI10.3982/ECTA23373MaRDI QIDQ7262080zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gabriel Carroll

Publication date 11 June 2026

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA23373

zbMATH Keywords

ex post perfect equilibriumoptimal penal coderepeated gamesuncertain repeated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Credible public policy
• Dynamic variational preferences
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Repeated games where the payoffs and monitoring structure are unknown
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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