Dynamics and Stability of Collective Action Norms

DOI10.1080/00222500801932014MaRDI QIDQ3499449zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James A. Kitts

Publication date 29 May 2008

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/00222500801932014

zbMATH Keywords

collective actioncomputational experimentsincentivesnorms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

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