Ex Post Information in Auctions

DOI10.2307/2297392MaRDI QIDQ3783045zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John G. Riley

Publication date 1988

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp367.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbuyers' private informationpositive royalty ratessealed bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Information revelation in auctions
• Optimal auctions and information disclosure
• The value of information for auctioneers

Cited in

(14)

• Stochastic dominance under Bayesian learning
• Two ways to auction off an uncertain good
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
• The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts
• Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
• Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud
• Comparisons of standard royalty auctions with seller post-auction effort
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts

This page was built for publication: Ex Post Information in Auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3783045)