Folk theorems in a class of additively separable games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.12.004MaRDI QIDQ1748536zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini

Publication date 11 May 2018

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11585/618521

zbMATH Keywords

additively separable gamesfolk theoremsNash equilibriumnoncooperative solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Game theory
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3511136 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives in Teams

Cited in

(3)

• Stackelberg leadership and managerial delegation under hyperbolic demand
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3188106 (Why is no real title available?)
• Self-enforcing collusion in large dynamic markets

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