Group selection under the replicator dynamic

DOI10.21203/RS.3.RS-3156278/V1MaRDI QIDQ7000710zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ratul Lahkar

Publication date 7 April 2025

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.21203/RS.3.RS-3156278/V1

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorygroup selectionreplicator dynamic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites work

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Cited in

(1)

• More players, less cooperation? Evolution of conditional cooperation in the N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma game

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