Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
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Cites work
- A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An Axiomatic Basis for the Ramsey-Weizsacker Overtaking Criterion
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Characterizing approval voting
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3641150 (Why is no real title available?)
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- Infinite populations, choice and determinacy
- Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size
- Intergenerational equity: Sup, inf, lim sup, and lim inf
- Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion.
- May's theorem with an infinite population
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- On some problems arising from Professor Rawls' conception of distributive justice
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Resolving distributional conflicts between generations
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Size approval voting
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- Utilitarianism for infinite utility streams: a new welfare criterion and its axiomatic characterization
- Variable-population voting rules
- Weighted approval voting
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