Information agreements

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2025.106068MaRDI QIDQ6912012zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kemal Kıvanç Aköz, Arseniy Samsonov

Publication date 23 October 2025

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2025.106068

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining solutionefficiencypersuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Algorithmic Bayesian persuasion
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Comparative statics and heterogeneity
• Competition in persuasion
• Competitive information disclosure by multiple senders
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226098 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2107836 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Linear conditions for positive determinants
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results
• Sequential persuasion
• Stress tests and information disclosure

This page was built for publication: Information agreements

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6912012)