Invariance properties of persistent equilibria and related solution concepts

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(00)00056-1MaRDI QIDQ5932221zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Dieter Balkenborg, Mathijs Jansen, Dries Vermeulen

Publication date 23 April 2002

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00056-1

zbMATH Keywords

invariancenoncooperative gamespersistent equilibriumpersistent retract

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Review text

The authors study the concepts of persistent equilibria and persistent retract introduced by \textit{E. Kalai} and \textit{D. Samet} [Int. J. Game Theory 13, 129-144 (1984; Zbl 0541.90097)]. They show that none of these concepts have all the properties of being invariant under the addition and deletion of an equivalent strategy and the property of not requiring the use of weakly dominated strategies. However a slight rephrasing of the concept of a persistent retract leads to a concept that has all the desired properties of invariance and does not require the use of a weakly dominated strategy.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(3)

• Making solutions invariant
• Persistent retracts and preparation
• Invariance With Dynamic Multipliers

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