Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces (Q2427132)

The concept of evolutionary stable sets in games with finite strategy spaces has been established since \textit{B. Thomas} [Theor. Popul. Biol. 28, 332--341 (1985; Zbl 0571.92018)], its dynamic properties within the context of the replicator dynamics are reasonably well understood and its usefulness widely accepted. For games with infinite strategy sets, the replicator dynamics has recently been studied by various authors, including \textit{J. Oechssler} and \textit{F. Riedel} [Econ. Theory 17, No. 1, 141--162 (2001; Zbl 0982.91002)]. In this article the author extend the concept of evolutionary stable sets and certain related concepts to the case of infinite strategy spaces. Its properties are systematically studied and various results are obtained that generalize the classical results known for finite strategy spaces. The underlying topology that is used by the author is the variational topology. Advantages and disadvantages of this topology with regards to the weak topology are discussed.