Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: a characterization result
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- A quadratic programming model for product configuration optimization
- A unifying framework for the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims
- Decentralization and mutual liability rules
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- How to divide when there isn't enough. From Aristotle, the Talmud, and Maimonides to the axiomatics of resource allocation
- Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
- Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
- Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- On solving mutual liability problems
- On the unification of centralized and decentralized clearing mechanisms in financial networks
- Priority Rules and Other Asymmetric Rationing Methods
- Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach
- PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
- Rationing in the presence of baselines
- Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- Systemic risk in financial systems
- The bankruptcy problem in financial networks
- The proportional solution for rights problems
- To fully net or not to net: adverse effects of partial multilateral netting
- Two axiomatizations of the pairwise netting proportional rule in financial networks
- Uniqueness of Clearing Payment Matrices in Financial Networks
This page was built for publication: Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: a characterization result
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6880936)