Motivated skepticism

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDAE058MaRDI QIDQ6910064zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jeanne Hagenbach, Charlotte Saucet

Publication date 29 October 2025

Published in The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/RESTUD/RDAE058

zbMATH Keywords

disclosure gamesendogenous depth of reasoninghard informationmotivated beliefsskepticismunravelling result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Can eco-labels tune a market? Evidence from dolphin-safe labeling
• Certifiable pre-play communication: full disclosure
• Communication with evidence in the lab
• Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs
• Endogenous depth of reasoning
• Identity, morals, and taboos: beliefs as assets
• Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation.
• Label confusion: the Groucho effect of uncertain standards
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Motivated memory in economics -- a review
• Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
• Self-Confidence and Personal Motivation
• Simple versus rich language in disclosure games
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
• Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
• Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing

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