Multibidding game under uncertainty

DOI10.1007/S10058-009-0096-5MaRDI QIDQ707707zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Róbert Ferenc Veszteg

Publication date 8 October 2010

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.unav.edu/documents/10174/6546776/1132582623_wp1404.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

uncertaintyefficiencybiddingpublic project

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Equilibrium in combinatorial public projects
• Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
• A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
• Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule

Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• A course in game theory.
• A dominant strategy double auction
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• The Accuracy of the Gaussian Approximation to the Sum of Independent Variates
• Voluntary auctions for noxious facilities: Incentives to participate and the efficiency of siting decisions

Cited in

(7)

• Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• A bidding game with heterogeneous players
• Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty
• Choosing and sharing
• One man, one bid
• Multi-recastable e-bidding game with dual-blindness

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Ox

This page was built for publication: Multibidding game under uncertainty

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q707707)