Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3270364 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078990 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on polynomial and separable games
- A polynomial optimization approach to principal-agent problems
- Computing generalized Nash equilibria by polynomial programming
- Every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable
- Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries
- On the testable implications of collective choice theories
- Separable and low-rank continuous games
- The testable implications of zero-sum games
Cited in
(6)- Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in continuous two-player weighted potential games
- On the openness of unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
- Recent advances on testability in economic equilibrium models
- ON A LESS KNOWN NASH EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS RESULT
- Multiple oracle algorithm to solve continuous games
- Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games
This page was built for publication: Note on unique Nash equilibrium in continuous games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1651236)