On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
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- On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
- The submodular welfare problem with demand queries
- Optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model
- Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
- Oblivious rounding and the integrality gap
Cited in
(29)- PASS approximation: a framework for analyzing and designing heuristics
- Approximating Nash social welfare under binary XOS and binary subadditive valuations
- Learning in auctions: regret is hard, envy is easy
- Best-response dynamics in combinatorial auctions with item bidding
- Improved prophet inequalities for combinatorial welfare maximization with (approximately) subadditive agents
- Economic efficiency requires interaction
- Tight bounds on \(\ell_1\) approximation and learning of self-bounding functions
- The implicit welfare weights used when maximizing aggregate surplus
- Optimization with demand oracles
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Optimal bounds on approximation of submodular and XOS functions by juntas
- Welfare maximization and the supermodular degree
- The submodular welfare problem with demand queries
- Approximation algorithms for inventory problems with submodular or routing costs
- Santa Claus Meets Hypergraph Matchings
- Scheduling to Maximize Participation
- Oblivious rounding and the integrality gap
- On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive
- Maximizing a class of submodular utility functions
- Permutation betting markets: singleton betting with extra information
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms
- Energy efficient monitoring in sensor networks
- The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds
- A constant factor prophet inequality for online combinatorial auctions
- Improved truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders
- On competitiveness in uniform utility allocation markets
- Scheduling to maximize participation
- Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
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