On the function of language

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00933-7MaRDI QIDQ6992114zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Joel Sobel

Publication date 28 April 2025

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3tb9m070

zbMATH Keywords

communicationconativereferential

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites work

• A two-person game of information transmission
• Cheap talk and burned money
• Directives, expressives, and motivation
• Efficient communication and indexicality
• Language barriers
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Mediated talk: an experiment
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(1)

• Meaning in communication games

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