Optimization of decisional power in representational systems with vote binding

DOI10.1080/0022250X.1985.9989997MaRDI QIDQ3714951zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. S. Redfern, C. Hoede

Publication date 1985

Published in The Journal of Mathematical Sociology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1985.9989997

zbMATH Keywords

decisional powerdistribution of seatseffect of vetoesEuropean economic communityEuropean parliamentminority protectionoptimal distribution of weightsrepresentational systemsvote bindingvoting weight

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

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Cites work

• A theory of decisional power
• Structural aspects of decisional power

Cited in

(1)

• Square root voting system, optimal threshold and \(\pi\)

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