Belief consistency and invariant risk preferences

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.03.005zbMATH Open1418.91210OpenAlexW2802249117MaRDI QIDQ1633671FDOQ1633671

Authors: Adam Dominiak, Gerelt Tserenjigmid 

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.005

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zbMATH Keywords

subjective expected utilityunawarenessreverse Bayesianisminvariant risk preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
• Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility
• Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple conditions for probabilistically sophisticated choice
• Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance
• Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result
• Unawareness -- a gentle introduction to both the literature and the special issue

Cited In (8)

• Pessimism and optimism towards new discoveries
• Reverse Bayesianism: a generalization
• An intertemporal model of growing awareness
• Savage's theorem under changing awareness
• The role of beliefs in inference for rational expectations models
• Reverse Bayesianism and act independence
• Ambiguity under growing awareness
• On the confidence preferences model

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