Belief consistency and invariant risk preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.005zbMath1418.91210OpenAlexW2802249117MaRDI QIDQ1633671

Adam Dominiak, Gerelt Tserenjigmid

Publication date: 20 December 2018

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

subjective expected utilityunawarenessreverse Bayesianisminvariant risk preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (5)

Pessimism and optimism towards new discoveries ⋮ Reverse Bayesianism and act independence ⋮ An intertemporal model of growing awareness ⋮ Ambiguity under growing awareness ⋮ Reverse Bayesianism: a generalization

Cites Work

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• Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility
• Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result
• Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple conditions for probabilistically sophisticated choice
• Unawareness -- a gentle introduction to both the literature and the special issue
• A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
• A Definition of Subjective Probability

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