Belief consistency and invariant risk preferences
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Cites work
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Awareness of unawareness: a theory of decision making in the face of ignorance
- Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility
- Bayes without Bernoulli: Simple conditions for probabilistically sophisticated choice
- Does exposure to unawareness affect risk preferences? A preliminary result
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3339023 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Unawareness -- a gentle introduction to both the literature and the special issue
Cited in
(9)- Savage's theorem under changing awareness
- Ambiguity under growing awareness
- Reverse Bayesianism: a generalization
- Reverse Bayesianism and act independence
- An intertemporal model of growing awareness
- The role of beliefs in inference for rational expectations models
- On the confidence preferences model
- Implicit knowledge in unawareness structures
- Pessimism and optimism towards new discoveries
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