Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion

DOI10.1007/s00446-012-0170-zzbMath1256.68017arXiv1204.3494OpenAlexW1966591256WikidataQ115792768 ScholiaQ115792768MaRDI QIDQ1938377

Ian A. Kash, Joseph Y. Halpern, Eric J. Friedman

Publication date: 4 February 2013

Published in: Distributed Computing (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.3494

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryP2P networksartificial currencyscrip systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Individual preferences (91B08) Distributed systems (68M14) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (10)

On the sustainability of credit-based P2P communities ⋮ Analyzing Scrip Systems ⋮ Efficient online exchange via fiat money ⋮ Infinite-duration poorman-bidding games ⋮ Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion ⋮ Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money ⋮ What is Money? ⋮ Technical Note—Analysis of Scrip Systems: On an Open Question in Johnson et al. (2014) ⋮ Token-Based Incentive Protocol Design for Online Exchange Systems ⋮ Infinite-Duration Bidding Games

Cites Work

• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• Optimizing scrip systems: crashes, altruists, hoarders, sybils and collusion
• The effect of collusion in congestion games
• Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Distributed computing meets game theory
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