Leasing versus selling and firm efficiency in oligopoly
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DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00213-XzbMATH Open0948.91032MaRDI QIDQ1978541FDOQ1978541
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
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- The comparison between selling and leasing for new and remanufactured products with quality level in the electric vehicle industry
- Leasing and selling: Optimal marketing strategies for a durable goods firm
- Sales or rentals? Price and service decisions for electric vehicle manufacturers
- ``Bricks vs. Clicks: the impact of manufacturer encroachment with a dealer leasing and selling of durable goods
- Durable goods leasing in the presence of exporting used products to an international secondary market
- Increasing channel profit in the sale of durable goods
- Cooperative R\&D with durable goods
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