Do charities spend more on their social programs when they cooperate than when they compete?

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.11.044MaRDI QIDQ2294643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Bertrand Crettez, Naïla Hayek, Georges Zaccour

Publication date 11 February 2020

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.11.044

zbMATH Keywords

advertisinggame theorydynamic gamescharitiesmanagement style

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

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Cites work

• A survey of game-theoretic models of cooperative advertising
• Funds allocation in NPOs: the role of administrative cost ratios
• HIV vs. the immune system: a differential game
• Quality competition with motivated providers and sluggish demand
• Recent developments in dynamic advertising research
• Strategic rivalry for market share: a contest theory approach to dynamic advertising competition

Cited in

(3)

• A cooperation scheme in multistage game of renewable resource extraction with asymmetric players
• A novel payoff distribution procedure for sustainable cooperation in an extensive game with payoffs at all nodes
• Is Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?

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