Distributed control under compromised measurements: resilient estimation, attack detection, and vehicle platooning
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Publication:2665740
DOI10.1016/J.AUTOMATICA.2021.109953zbMATH Open1478.93244arXiv2010.09661OpenAlexW3205437656MaRDI QIDQ2665740FDOQ2665740
Authors: Xingkang He, Ehsan Hashemi, Karl Henrik Johansson 
Publication date: 19 November 2021
Published in: Automatica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We study how to design a secure observer-based distributed controller such that a group of vehicles can achieve accurate state estimates and formation control even if the measurements of a subset of vehicle sensors are compromised by a malicious attacker. We propose an architecture consisting of a resilient observer, an attack detector, and an observer-based distributed controller. The distributed detector is able to update three sets of vehicle sensors: the ones surely under attack, surely attack-free, and suspected to be under attack. The adaptive observer saturates the measurement innovation through a preset static or time-varying threshold, such that the potentially compromised measurements have limited influence on the estimation. Essential properties of the proposed architecture include: 1) The detector is fault-free, and the attacked and attack-free vehicle sensors can be identified in finite time; 2) The observer guarantees both real-time error bounds and asymptotic error bounds, with tighter bounds when more attacked or attack-free vehicle sensors are identified by the detector; 3) The distributed controller ensures closed-loop stability. The effectiveness of the proposed methods is evaluated through simulations by an application to vehicle platooning.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2010.09661
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Design techniques (robust design, computer-aided design, etc.) (93B51) Adaptive control/observation systems (93C40) Networked control (93B70) Observers (93B53)
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Cited In (8)
- Innovation-based stealthy attack against distributed state estimation over sensor networks
- Security-aware optimal actuator placement in vehicle platooning
- On distributed constrained formation control in operator-vehicle adversarial networks
- An adaptive observer design for denial‐of‐service attack detection in platoon
- Resilient distributed field estimation
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- Data-driven time-varying formation-containment control for a heterogeneous air-ground vehicle team subject to active leaders and switching topologies
- Secure and collision-free multi-platoon control of automated vehicles under data falsification attacks
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