Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions
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Publication:295699
DOI10.1016/J.JECONOM.2008.07.003zbMATH Open1420.91119OpenAlexW2017755102MaRDI QIDQ295699FDOQ295699
Authors: David McAdams
Publication date: 13 June 2016
Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10161/1901
Recommendations
Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Simultaneous statistical inference. 2nd ed
- Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions
- Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions
- Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions
Cited In (5)
- Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
- Partial identification and testable restrictions in multi-unit auctions
- Structural econometric methods in auctions: a guide to the literature
- Characterization of bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions
- Uniform price auctions with a last accepted bid pricing rule
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