The power of one secret agent

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.FUN.2018.32MaRDI QIDQ3301024zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tami Tamir

Publication date 11 August 2020

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.FUN.2018.32

zbMATH Keywords

cost sharingequilibrium inefficiencyjob scheduling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Noncooperative games (91A10) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• Cost-sharing scheduling games on restricted unrelated machines
• Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038734 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
• On the impact of singleton strategies in congestion games
• Optimal cost-sharing in general resource selection games
• Rational synthesis
• Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation
• Scheduling
• Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(1)

• The power of one evil secret agent

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