The power of one evil secret agent
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Publication:2196556
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2020.05.021zbMATH Open1457.91122OpenAlexW3028124513MaRDI QIDQ2196556FDOQ2196556
Authors: Tami Tamir 
Publication date: 3 September 2020
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2020.05.021
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Cites Work
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- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Rational synthesis
- Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
- Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
- The efficiency of best-response dynamics
- Optimal cost-sharing in general resource selection games
- On the impact of singleton strategies in congestion games
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