The power of one evil secret agent
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Publication:2196556
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2020.05.021zbMath1457.91122OpenAlexW3028124513MaRDI QIDQ2196556
Publication date: 3 September 2020
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2020.05.021
Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)
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Cites Work
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