Product recalls and channel pricing
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Publication:5140355
Recommendations
- The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1086934
- Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
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Cites work
- A Differential Game of a Dual Distribution Channel
- A note on feedback sequential equilibria in a Lanchester model with empirical application
- A stochastic control model of economic growth with environmental disaster prevention
- Competing for consumer's attention
- On the coordination of dynamic marketing channels and two-part tariffs
- Profiting from product-harm crises in competitive markets
- Stochastic competitive entries and dynamic pricing
Cited in
(5)- Advertising and quality improving strategies in a supply chain when facing potential crises
- The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic
- Price and quality competition while envisioning a quality-related product recall
- Profiting from product-harm crises in competitive markets
- Managing quality and pricing during a product recall: an analysis of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis regimes
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