The impact of product recall on advertising decisions and firm profit while envisioning crisis or being hazard myopic

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2020.06.021MaRDI QIDQ2028779zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arka Mukherjee, Satyaveer Chauhan

Publication date 3 June 2021

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.021

zbMATH Keywords

crisis likelihood and impactequilibrium advertisinggame theoryhazard myopiaproduct recall

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Marketing, advertising (90B60) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Optimal stochastic control (93E20)

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Cites work

• A stochastic control model of economic growth with environmental disaster prevention
• An Empirical Investigation of Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Duopoly
• An optimal control problem with a random stopping time
• Could myopic pricing be a strategic choice in marketing channels? A game theoretic analysis
• Deterministic and stochastic optimization of a dynamic advertising model
• Differential game models of advertising competition
• Dynamics of competing with quality- and advertising-based goodwill
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5010674 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45454 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734466 (Why is no real title available?)
• Profiting from product-harm crises in competitive markets
• Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts

Cited in

(12)

• Analysis of traceability optimization and shareholder's profit for efficient supply chain operation under product recall crisis
• Profiting from product-harm crises in competitive markets
• Advertising and quality improving strategies in a supply chain when facing potential crises
• Product recalls and channel pricing
• Are government initiated recalls more damaging for shareholders? Evidence from automotive recalls, 1973--1998
• Price and quality competition while envisioning a quality-related product recall
• Managing quality and pricing during a product recall: an analysis of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis regimes
• A survey of dynamic models of product quality
• Cheating or delighting customers on quality: strategic implications for delayed information disclosure
• Greenwashing risks in environmental quality competition: detection and deterrence
• Dynamic pricing and advertising decisions to mitigate the negative spillover effect of a product recall
• Dynamic capacity allocation under service-dependent demand and market exit risk

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