Social surplus determines cooperation rates in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma
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Publication:516976
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.08.010zbMATH Open1394.91081MaRDI QIDQ516976FDOQ516976
Authors: Gary Charness, Luca Rigotti, Aldo Rustichini 
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Promises and Partnership
- Beliefs and actions in the trust game: creating instrumental variables to estimate the causal effect
- Preplay contracting in the Prisoners’ Dilemma
- Magical thinking: a representation result
- Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
Cited In (9)
- Endogenous transfers in the prisoner's dilemma game: an experimental test of cooperation and coordination
- Motives behind cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Equilibrium as compatibility of plans
- Social preferences, positive expectations, and trust based cooperation
- Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities
- Social values and cooperation. Results from an iterated prisoner's dilemma experiment
- Cooperation in viscous populations-experimental evidence
- Opportunistic conformism
- Evolution of cooperation through adaptive interaction in a spatial prisoner's dilemma game
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