Optimization model for salesforce compensation under effort level
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Publication:5490146
DOI10.1080/02522667.2005.10699667zbMATH Open1116.91057OpenAlexW1986810999MaRDI QIDQ5490146FDOQ5490146
Authors: Miaosheng Chen, Horngjinh Chang, Chin-Nung Liao 
Publication date: 4 October 2006
Published in: Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2005.10699667
Recommendations
Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)
Cites Work
- Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An Investigation of the Equal Commission Rate Policy for a Multi-Product Salesforce
- Jointly Optimal Sales Commissions for Nonincome Maximizing Sales Forces
- Two-stage production plan of probabilistic market demand with unreliable machines and obtainable working hour capacity
Cited In (8)
- The effects of transaction cost on market transparency when Hotelling market
- Optimal control of salesforce compensation under transaction cost
- Quota-Based Compensation Plans for Multiterritory Heterogeneous Salesforces
- Setting Commission Rates for the Control of the Salesperson's Client-prospect Effort Allocation
- Salesforce contracting under model uncertainty
- The Optimal Compensation for Heterogeneous Salesforce
- From the sides of firm to manage the salesforce compensation plans
- Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon
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