Demand Signalling Under Unobservable Effort in Franchising: Linear and Nonlinear Price Contracts

DOI10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1608zbMath0861.90089OpenAlexW2144777682MaRDI QIDQ5689378

Preyas Desai, Kannan Srinivasan

Publication date: 6 January 1997

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1608

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmarketingpricingprincipalfranchisingchannelssignalling strategyuninformed risk-neutral agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44) Marketing, advertising (90B60)

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