Demand Signalling Under Unobservable Effort in Franchising: Linear and Nonlinear Price Contracts
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Publication:5689378
DOI10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1608zbMath0861.90089MaRDI QIDQ5689378
Preyas Desai, Kannan Srinivasan
Publication date: 6 January 1997
Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.41.10.1608
asymmetric information; marketing; pricing; principal; franchising; channels; signalling strategy; uninformed risk-neutral agent
91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B44: Economics of information
90B60: Marketing, advertising
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