Complexity of equilibria in first-price auctions under general tie-breaking rules
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Publication:6499258
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929 (Why is no real title available?)
- A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
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- The approximation complexity of win-lose games
- The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
- The complexity of constrained min-max optimization
- The complexity of non-monotone markets
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
- Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
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