Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
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Publication:6565484
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2024.02.008MaRDI QIDQ6565484FDOQ6565484
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
- Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
- Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
- A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Tag-based spite with correlated interactions
- Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option
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