Prophet inequalities via the expected competitive ratio
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Publication:6609147
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_16MaRDI QIDQ6609147FDOQ6609147
Authors: Tomer Ezra, Stefano Leonardi, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Matteo Russo, Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis 
Publication date: 20 September 2024
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Internet topics (68M11)
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