Learning under supervision: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9164-2zbMath1140.91324OpenAlexW2108792368MaRDI QIDQ934684

Andrew Schotter, Raghuram Iyengar

Publication date: 30 July 2008

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9164-2

zbMATH Keywords

LearningAdviceGroup decision makingSupervision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

• Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
• A surprise-quiz view of learning in economic experiments
• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
• Learning by not doing: An experimental investigation of observational learning
• Price competition between teams
• Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
• A Model of Expertise
• A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix
• Unnamed Item

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