Reasoning about your own future mistakes

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.09.010MaRDI QIDQ6911051zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Martin Meier, Andres Perea

Publication date 27 October 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.09.010

zbMATH Keywords

cautious reasoningdynamic gamesnon-standard analysisown mistakesperfect backwards rationalizabilityperfect quasi-perfect equilibriumperfect rationalizabilityprocedural quasi-perfect rationalizabilityquasi-perfect rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites work

• A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
• Belief in the opponents' future rationality
• Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
• Function Theory on Some Nonarchimedean Fields
• Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Lexicographic probability, conditional probability, and nonstandard probability
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge

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