Reflections on vote manipulation

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_30MaRDI QIDQ3094024zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jan van Eijck, Floor Sietsma, Sunil Simon

Publication date 19 October 2011

Published in Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_30

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A geometric look at manipulation
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Cited in

(3)

• On avoiding vote swapping
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5816544 (Why is no real title available?)
• A geometric look at manipulation

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