Regulating oligopolistic competition
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Abstract: We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner in which firms compete. In the optimal regulatory policy, the regulator need only solicit prices from firms, and based on those prices, charge them taxes or give them subsidies, and impose on each firm a ``yardstick price cap that depends on the posted prices of competing firms.
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Cites work
- Equilibrium with Product Differentiation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3278986 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
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