Repetitive advertising to deter entry.

DOI10.1111/1467-999X.00130MaRDI QIDQ2783532zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hiroaki Ishigaki

Publication date 2001

Published in Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-999x.00130

zbMATH Keywords

advertisingmulti-stage gamepricesubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Recommendations

• Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model
• Informative Advertising and Competition: A Noncooperative Approach
• Preentry advertising and entry deterrence.
• Three-stage entry game: the strategic effects of advertising
• Entry deterrence, coordinating advertising and pricing in markets with consumption externalities

Cited in

(5)

• Informative advertising and entry deterrence: A Bertrand model
• Entry deterrence, coordinating advertising and pricing in markets with consumption externalities
• Preentry advertising and entry deterrence.
• Three-stage entry game: the strategic effects of advertising
• A note on increasing returns to advertising

This page was built for publication: Repetitive advertising to deter entry.

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2783532)