Signaling quality: Dynamic price-advertising model
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- Publication:3026691
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4098590 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1734433 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- Dynamic Optimal Control Models in Advertising: Recent Developments
- Prices as Signals of Product Quality
- Product Differentiation with Imperfect Information
- Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence
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- Dissipative advertising signals quality: static model with a continuum of types
- Advertising and quality-dependent word-of-mouth in a contagion sales model
- Dynamic pricing, reference price, and price-quality relationship
- Recent developments in dynamic advertising research
- Dynamic interaction among price, quality, durability and the sales rate in a steady state environment: a theoretical analysis
- Dual-role based pricing in a dynamic and competitive environment
- A dynamic advertising model with reference price effect
- Impacts of knowledge on online brand success: an agent-based model for online market share enhancement
- Interaction of pricing, advertising and experience quality: a dynamic analysis
- A Lanchester-type dynamic game of advertising and pricing
- Fixed price and quality signals
- Price signaling with salient-thinking consumers
- An analytical model of the relationship between product quality and advertising
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