Spatial voting games, relation algebra and RelView
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1953899 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1390243 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 234018 (Why is no real title available?)
- An interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation
- Applying relation algebra and RelView to measures in a social network
- Applying relational algebra and REL VIEW to coalition formation
- Computational social choice using relation algebra and RelView
- Computations on simple games using \texttt{RelView}
- Computing tournament solutions using relation algebra and RelView
- General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
- Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
- Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
- Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
- Social Software for Coalition Formation
- Social networks: prestige, centrality, and influence (invited paper)
- The geometry of the uncovered set in the three-voter spatial model
- Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments
Cited in
(7)- Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
- Computations on simple games using \texttt{RelView}
- Relation Algebra and RelView Applied to Approval Voting
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- Control of Condorcet voting: complexity and a relation-algebraic approach
- Computational social choice using relation algebra and RelView
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