The following pages link to Geometry of voting (Q1323813):
Displaying 50 items.
- Aggregation of binary evaluations: a Borda-like approach (Q258936) (← links)
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence (Q277309) (← links)
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically? (Q404772) (← links)
- Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings (Q449038) (← links)
- Arrow's theorem and theory choice (Q484976) (← links)
- Positional rules and \(q\)-Condorcet consistency (Q497946) (← links)
- Resolute refinements of social choice correspondences (Q502364) (← links)
- Finding the threshold of exclusion for all single seat and multi-seat scoring rules: illustrated by results for the Borda and Dowdall rules (Q505282) (← links)
- A note on permutations and rank aggregation (Q611777) (← links)
- A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method (Q622582) (← links)
- Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: monotonicity versus unanimity on finitely restricted domains (Q656809) (← links)
- Rank-based choice correspondences (Q673207) (← links)
- The ease of generating chaotic behavior in economics. (Q815646) (← links)
- Neural voting machines (Q853291) (← links)
- Characteristic properties of list proportional representation systems (Q857969) (← links)
- An axiomatic characterization of different majority concepts (Q858426) (← links)
- The senatorial election in spain. Proportional Borda methods for selecting several candidates (Q926353) (← links)
- On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules (Q993505) (← links)
- Aggregation and decision making using ranked data (Q1038271) (← links)
- On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules (Q1277472) (← links)
- Consensus rules for committee elections (Q1296465) (← links)
- The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules (Q1368871) (← links)
- Weak independence and veto power. (Q1606284) (← links)
- The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner (Q1606439) (← links)
- Generalized Rawlsianism (Q1704409) (← links)
- Axiomatic characterization of the center function. The case of non-universal axioms (Q1752587) (← links)
- The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes (Q1763193) (← links)
- Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes (Q1806204) (← links)
- Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences (Q1814942) (← links)
- From linear algebra via affine algebra to projective algebra (Q1826720) (← links)
- On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data (Q1867823) (← links)
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence. (Q1867836) (← links)
- The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions (Q1966226) (← links)
- On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner (Q1972344) (← links)
- Breaking ties in collective decision-making (Q2044831) (← links)
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory (Q2064124) (← links)
- A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems (Q2244415) (← links)
- Condorcet completion methods that inhibit manipulation through exploiting knowledge of electorate preferences (Q2346947) (← links)
- Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations (Q2353589) (← links)
- Axiomatic characterization of the center function. the case of universal axioms (Q2357132) (← links)
- A characterization of the Borda rule in peer ratings (Q2384876) (← links)
- Complexity and the geometry of voting (Q2389766) (← links)
- Consistency without neutrality in voting rules: When is a vote an average? (Q2389767) (← links)
- The flow network method (Q2417378) (← links)
- Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules (Q2417418) (← links)
- Assent-maximizing social choice (Q2452261) (← links)
- In quest of the Banks set in spatial voting games (Q2453435) (← links)
- Robustness against inefficient manipulation (Q2460084) (← links)
- The scoring rules in an endogenous election (Q2500707) (← links)
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules (Q2500719) (← links)