Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(90)90002-CMaRDI QIDQ1196624zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James W. Friedman, Larry Samuelson

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90002-c

zbMATH Keywords

discountingexistence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3278986 (Why is no real title available?)
• Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions
• On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly
• Reaction Functions as Nash Equilibria
• Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria
• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
• The Existence of Nash Equilibria in Reaction Functions for Dynamic Models of Oligopoly
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

Cited in

(11)

• Repeated contests: a general parameterization
• On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs
• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
• Credibility, smooth expectation and inflation persistence
• Continuous reaction functions in duopolies
• An extension of the ``folk theorem with continuous reaction functions
• Existence and local stability of Pareto superior reaction function equilibria in discounted supergames
• Punishment strategies in repeated games: evidence from experimental markets
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
• On the multiplicity of perfect equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly
• Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions

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